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I. INTRODUCTION
Judiciaries around the globe developed out of the premise that
people who are wronged should have an opportunity to seek relief in
an institutionalized forum.1 This access to justice principle is
foundational to both the domestic and the international rule of law.2
1.See United Nations, Access to Justice, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematicareas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/access-to-justice/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2019) (“Access to justice is a basic principle of the rule of law. In the absence
of access to justice, people are unable to have their voice heard, exercise their rights,
challenge discrimination or hold decision-makers accountable.”); see also United
Nations
Development
Programme
[UNDP],
Access
to
Justice,
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/2030-agenda-for-sustainabledevelopment/peace/rule-of-law--justice--security-and-human-rights/access-tojustice.html (last visited Jul. 4, 2020) (affirming the U.N. position on access to
justice and the rule of law); Ginevra Peruginelli, Law Belongs to the People: Access
to Law and Justice, 16 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 107, 107–08 (2016) (describing how the
rule of law is partially based upon “the institutions that produce, implement and
enforce [the law]”).
2. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR] art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (articulating
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The codification of this principle in national judiciaries, however, does
not always ensure that people have access to judicial review.3
State immunity presents one limitation on parties’ rights to bring
suit in national judicial forums.4 This form of immunity protects
foreign states from being subject to suit in other nations’ judiciaries
and is expressly recognized by many international cases over the last
several centuries.5 While this restraint has not always conflicted with
expectations of fair access to justice, globalization has altered the
calculus surrounding state immunity from suit.6 As foreign direct
investment and international commercial activities increased, many
states placed restrictions on state immunity and have allowed suit
against foreign nations to proceed in certain circumstances.7 The most
the “Right to a Fair Trial”); The Magna Carta of Edward 1, 1297, 25 Edw. 1., cl. 29
[hereinafter Magna Carta] (describing a person’s right to access “the lawful
judgment of his Peers or by the Law of the Land.”).
3. See Jan Paulsson, Enclaves of Justice, U. OF MIAMI LEGAL STUD., Apr. 2007,
at 2–3 (suggesting that justice is “a surprising anomaly” and that the assumption of
injustice being abnormal is erroneous).
4. See Kyp Koumi, Sovereign Immunity: The Restrictive View Grows, 10 LAW
TCHR. 101, 101 (1976) (describing a state’s entitlement to proper respect for its
dignity and independence).
5. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 58 (Feb. 14) (reiterating that state immunity from suit is
customary international law and provided to state actors for the purpose of ensuring
that they are fully able to serve in the role of state); The Parlement Belge Case, 1880,
5 P.D. 197, 207–08 (finding that an ambassador to a country must be given state
immunity to protect the independence and equality of the state from which they hail).
6. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (creating the World
Trade Organization (WTO), where international issues can be reviewed by an
international judicial forum); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992 O.J. (C 202) (promoting economic integration and trade within
the European Union); The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development [OECD], Declaration on International Investments and Multinational
Enterprises, OECD Doc. OECD/LEGAL/0144 (June 21, 1976) [hereinafter OECD
Declaration] (providing for a more open and transparent investment environment
between the declaration’s signatories); Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S. 159; 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID] (establishing an institution
dedicated to administering international arbitrations).
7. See Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and
International Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 731–32 (2009) (explaining
how the rise of investment arbitration has pushed access to justice on an international
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common limitation on state immunity allows people to bring suit
against a state that is engaging in private commercial activities.8
The basis of this type of restriction is the idea that states acting as
corporations should not receive the same immunity from suit that
nations engaging in sovereign activities enjoy. 9 Unfortunately, as this
paper will show, some states have allowed their commercial
restrictions on state immunity to contradict one another, thus creating
an access to justice problem for potential litigants.10 This contradiction
undermines the rule of law because the process that a party is entitled
to fails to match that to which it has access.11
Part II of this paper provides background on access to justice and
governmental immunity principles, information on the U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and act of state doctrine, and
necessary context related to this Comment’s focus case (Sea Breeze
Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi).12 Part III analyzes the conflict between access
to justice rights and governmental immunity. It demonstrates how
improper management of the tension between these two legal concepts
injures parties seeking redress for harm done by governmental actors
and weakens the international rule of law.13 Part IV recommends the
implementation of statutory provisions that better address situations
where inconsistent state immunity doctrines are found.14 In the
absence of these provisions, this paper also suggests that companies
level to the point of being customary international law).
8. See Winston P. Nagan & Joshua L. Root, The Emerging Restrictions on
Sovereign Immunity: Peremptory Norms of International Law, the U.N. Charter,
and the Application of Modern Communications Theory, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 375, 410–11, 417 (2013) (outlining the various restrictions on state immunity).
9. See William Harvey Reeves, Leviathan Bound-Sovereign Immunity in a
Modern World, 43 VA. L. REV. 529, 545, 549 (1956) (describing pure state immunity
as an “anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege” and describing how
commercial acts must “appear no different from other (non-governmental)
commercial transactions”).
10. See, e.g., Complaint at 20, Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi, 899 F.3d 1064
(9th Cir. 2018) (No. 2:16-cv-02345) (requesting relief in the form of $100 million
for Innofoods and $500 million for Sea Breeze Salt, Inc.).
11. See Paulsson, supra note 3, at 2–3 (highlighting how a failure to provide
process undermines the rule of law and erodes public confidence in courts).
12. Infra Part II.
13. Infra Part III.
14. Infra Part IV.
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and individuals think strategically about their structures and partners.15
Finally, Part V will conclude by describing how a failure to remedy
the inconsistency in its state immunity doctrines would lead the United
States to undermine the international rule of law.16

II. BACKGROUND
A. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
The international rule of law is premised upon the idea that people,
entities, and states all have rights and obligations that deserve
institutional protection.17 When the right to seek judicial review and
the violation of a recognized right combine, the rule of law requires
that an individual have access to legal processes for determining the
appropriate remedy.18 This principle is foundational to national,
regional, and international judicial systems.
At the national level, many countries expressly provide for rights to
a fair trial, due process, and access to justice.19 These rights can be
found in constitutions, civil codes, bills of rights, and other primary
legal documents in countries throughout North America,20 South

15. Infra Part IV.
16. Infra Part V. Conclusion
17. See generally Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 331, 336, 355 (2008) (describing the role “process” plays in understanding
the rule of law at both the national and international level).
18. See id. at 355 (noting how, subject to a few State-mandated restrictions, the
“clear normative regime” related to the rule of law requires process guarantees). But
see Paulsson, supra note 3, at 2–3 (noting that this idealistic view of the rule of law
is far from the reality).
19. See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 3–9
(Aug.
5,
2008),
https://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/cm_archives/right_to_a_fair_trial.
pdf?6c8912 (providing “sample constitutional provisions” on rule of law principles).
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring that U.S. citizens not be
deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, arts. 14, 17 (Mex.)
(outlining the Mexican right to due process).
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America,21 Europe,22 Asia,23 and Africa.24
At the regional level, the idea of access to justice is found in several
multinational treaties.25 While these treaties predominately speak to
fair trial arising as a requirement in situations of criminal prosecution,
regional courts have found these rights applicable in civil case settings
as well.26
Finally, at the international level, several important treaties include
judicial process rights at the forefront of their obligations.27 In all
cases, nationally, regionally, and internationally, the described “right”
signifies access to justice in the form of an institutionalized process.
In the commercial sphere, access to justice on an international level
has expanded over the last few centuries.28 As global commercial
activities became more common, so did the need for cross-border
21. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5(LIV) (Braz.)
(providing the Brazilian equivalent of a right to trial).
22. See, e.g., Arts. 24, 111, 113 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (articulating the Italian
right to be heard in court); CONST. PORT., 1976, arts. 20, 32, 268(4)–(5) (providing
Portuguese citizens “[a]ccess to law and effective judicial protection”); Magna
Carta, supra note 2, cl. 29 (providing the right to “lawful judgment”).
23. See, e.g., XIANFA art. 130 (1982) (China) (detailing the Chinese right to a
public trial); RADTHATHAMMANOON [CONSTITUTION] 1997, B.E. 241, sec. 29
(Thai.) (outlining the right to a trial in criminal matters); NIHONKOKU KENPŌ
[KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 37, para. 1 (Japan) (describing the Japanese right to
a criminal trial).
24. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 34, 35.3 (providing the South African
right to due process).
25. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 245, arts. 3, 7, 26 [hereinafter Banjul Charter] (outlining the
importance of the right to access judicial process); ECHR, supra note 2, art. 6
(outlining the right to a criminal trial); Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123, arts. 3, 8, 9, 10 (outlining the importance of judicial process to human rights).
26. See generally, e.g., Apeh v. Hungary, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 361 (noting that
due process rights apply in both the civil and criminal context).
27. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 14, 16,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (describing the right to a fair
trial); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10 (Dec.
10, 1948) (“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
and of any criminal charge against him.”).
28. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE
L.J. 775, 858–60 (noting differences between first and second-generation
international adjudication).
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dispute resolution.29 This need has led to the rise of international
agreements that regulate transnational activity, which in turn has
increased the use of international fora for transnational dispute
resolution.30 Multinational disputes can be resolved in a variety of
settings, including before international institutions, in confidential
arbitral proceedings, and within national courts.31
While access to justice in this area is expansive, especially with the
rise of alternative fora of dispute resolution, it is not unlimited.32 For
various political, cultural, and economic reasons, many countries and
institutions place barriers in the path of obtaining judicial review
within their given jurisdictions.33 One such barrier is state immunity
from suit.34

B. INTERNATIONAL THEORIES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
While sovereign states are not the only actors on the world stage,
they are critical ones.35 As such, they are afforded special immunity

29. See, e.g., GATT 1994, supra note 6, at 23 (establishing the WTO, where
international trade issues are reviewed by an international judicial forum).
30. See generally Born, supra note 28, at 859–67 (analyzing the development
and success of international adjudication).
31. Compare Matteo P. Arena & Stephen P. Ferris, A Global Analysis of
Corporate Litigation Risk and Costs, 56 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 28 (2018) (analyzing
litigation in the commercial sphere as one option for resolving disputes), with Susan
D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights under Investment
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 47, 52–55 (2005) (describing international treaty arbitration as another
dispute resolution option available to commercial parties).
32. See Chesterman, supra note 17, at 350–55 (noting that while a domestic legal
order may be able to place the sovereign “in a vertical hierarchy with other subjects
of law,” international organizations such as the WTO, the I.C.C., and the United
Nations are not yet “autonomous and complete jurisdictions in a manner comparable
to the national legal systems that gave rise to the concept of rule of law”).
33. See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081,
1090–1100 (2015) (outlining “avoidance doctrines” that the United States uses to
keep transnational cases that are too “foreign” from being reviewed in U.S. courts).
34. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (describing the widespread acceptance of
state immunity).
35. See generally DAVID A. LAKE, THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(2007) (highlighting the importance of the state and outlining the main theories that
seek to describe the role of the state in international relations theory).
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from suit in many national courts around the globe.36 By applying state
immunity to national judicial proceedings, countries limit plaintiffs’
opportunities to bring an action directly against a foreign sovereign. 37
There are two main theories of state immunity—absolute and
restrictive.38
Absolute Immunity and the Leviathan State
The first approach, absolute immunity, is based upon the idea of an
absolute or Leviathan sovereign with unchecked power over its
people.39 When Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth-century English
philosopher, spoke of the “social contract” between states and peoples,
he described a relationship wherein an absolute state would offer
protection and security to its people in exchange for unquestioned
authority.40
Under a Leviathan theory of state immunity, there are no situations
where a state would be subject to suit in a national court.41 In terms of
the international rule of law, so-called “rights violations” committed
by states are not violations at all, because the state has the capacity to
do whatever it pleases.42
General Welfare States and the Sovereign Corporation
Alternatively, the second theory of state immunity—the restrictive
theory—provides wider access to justice to the detriment of unlimited
36. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602–11 (1976) [hereinafter FSIA] (providing foreign states immunity
from suit within U.S. national courts).
37. See George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476, 476–78 (1953) (providing historical background of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
38. See, Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (explaining the various theories of state or
sovereign immunity).
39. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 531 (describing the Leviathan state as an
absolute sovereign with absolute, unquestioned authority).
40. See id. at 530–32 (detailing Thomas Hobbes’ description of the social
contract between Leviathan states and their people).
41. See id. at 531 (describing how Hobbes “endow[ed] sovereignty with those
same qualities which Rome attributed to it: superior right, all power, every privilege,
absolute immunity”).
42. See id. at 531–32 (noting that a state cannot violate rights because it “ow[es]
nothing but physical defense to the people over whom it ruled”).
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sovereign power.43 While international custom may compel states to
offer one another some form of immunity, it does not require that this
immunity be absolute.44 Under the restrictive theory, the state operates
as a protector of the general welfare, and not as an absolute authority.45
People grant sovereignty to the general welfare state in exchange for
social, political, and economic support and protection.46
When providing these forms of support and protection, the state will
often engage in commercial activity, both domestically and
transnationally.47 When this happens, the state essentially acts as a
sovereign corporation.48 It simultaneously enjoys the flexibility and
privacy of a corporate entity with the limited liability of the state.49
In response to this development, state legislatures in restrictive
theory jurisdictions have transitioned to providing immunity only in
cases where a foreign government is acting predominantly as a
government and not as a commercial entity.50 Of course, determining
when a government is acting as a commercial agent (or when a
commercial agent is acting as a government) is a complex exercise.
Rather than provide an exhaustive list of factors that can go into these
43. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (describing how the restrictive theory is
considered sanctioned by customary international law).
44. See generally id. (noting the transition away from the absolute theory and
recognizing that this shift has a ripple effect on what constitutes international
customary law).
45. See Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 410–17 (explaining that the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity bifurcates sovereign immunity between commercial
and non-commercial activity).
46. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 537–38 (describing the “general welfare” state
as a product of modern extensions to the social contract).
47. See Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 411 (highlighting the increased
“commercial interactions between states” and describing how the commercial
exception was the “first categorical exception to the rule”).
48. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 530 (noting that “[c]orporate sovereignty is
stronger than the sum total of all of its parts and has attributes and qualities which
none of them possess”).
49. See id. at 530–32 (describing how the sovereign corporation would enjoy
public and private rights to the detriment of the people it ruled over).
50. See Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 422–23 (explaining how the United
Kingdom, the United States, South Africa, Singapore, Argentina, Israel, Japan,
Pakistan, and Canada have all transitioned into a restrictive version of state
immunity); see also, e.g., State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-18, art. 5 (Can.)
(establishing restricted immunity for states in Canada in cases which “relate to any
commercial activity of the foreign state”).
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analyses, this paper will look at how the United States has integrated
commercial activity exceptions into its two primary immunity
doctrines—the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the
common law act of state doctrine.51

C. RESTRICTIVE STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINES IN THE UNITED
STATES
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
The United States codifies the restrictive theory of state immunity
via the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).52 The FSIA allows
foreign governments to avoid suit in the United States by providing
them with state immunity.53 While state immunity is the default under
the FSIA, there are exceptions that allow plaintiffs to bring suit against
foreign states in U.S. national courts.54 Under these exceptions, if a
state violates another party’s rights, immunity is not provided and the
aggrieved party is due a judicial process.55
This paper focuses on the commercial exception captured in
§1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.56 This exception targets instances when a
foreign state acts as a commercial agent and influences commercial
activity in the United States.57 The foreign state’s influence can be
either direct through actions taking place within U.S. territory, or
51. Infra Part II.C.1. (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)); Part II.C.2
(Act of State Doctrine).
52. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (declaring the United States’ intent to
limit state immunity).
53. See id. § 1604 (“Subject to existing international agreements . . . a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”).
54. See id. § 1605 (outlining the “[g]eneral exceptions to the jurisdictional
immunity of a foreign state”).
55. See id. § 1605(a) (clarifying that “a foreign state shall not be immune” under
the exceptions in this section) (emphasis added).
56. See id. § 1605(a)(2) (“[A] foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.”).
57. See id. (requiring a connection between the United States and the commercial
activity of the foreign state).
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indirect through ripple effects from extranational conduct resulting in
consequences in the United States.58 In either case, the FSIA serves as
a symbol of the legislative branch’s decision that a state acting as a
corporation will not receive immunity in U.S. national courts.59
2. Act of State Doctrine
The common law act of state doctrine also provides a form of state
immunity to foreign sovereigns.60 This doctrine requires that U.S.
courts decline jurisdiction in cases involving the review of a foreign
sovereign’s actions.61 Defendants have used it as a defense, a
jurisdictional barrier, a choice of law rule, a rule of evidence, and an
avoidance doctrine.62
The act of state doctrine developed out of common law in response
to policy concerns surrounding the U.S. judiciary’s role in
international relations.63 In 1897, the U.S. judiciary first grappled with
these concerns in adjudicating Underhill v. Hernandez, a case where
a U.S. citizen working in Venezuela made a series of requests to a
Venezuelan military official, all of which were denied.64 The sitting
Court ruled in favor of the Venezuelan government official, noting that
his actions were those of the Venezuelan government and that it would

58. See id. (describing how an effect on U.S. commerce may satisfy the
requirements of this exception).
59. See id. (providing that a foreign state engaging in commercial activity which
affects the United States will not be granted immunity).
60. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)
(describing how, under the act of state doctrine, the judiciary “will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence
of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles,
even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law”).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 443 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (providing a summary of how the United States
and its courts have understood and applied the act of state doctrine).
62. See generally Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (providing a major case in which a
defendant used the act of state doctrine to avoid review by a U.S. court).
63. See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PENN.
L. REV. 325, 330–44 (1986) (describing the emergence and evolution of the act of
state doctrine in the common law).
64. See generally 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (providing an overview of the facts of the
case).
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be improper for any U.S. court to judge the validity of that conduct.65
Underhill emphasized the need for a separation of powers between the
three branches of government – executive, legislative, and judicial –
when diplomatic relations with other countries are involved.66 The
Court decided ultimately that the validity of the military official’s
conduct was a matter for the executive or legislative branch, and not
the judiciary.67 Thus, it refused to award the U.S. plaintiff any relief.68
Roughly seventy years later, in 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court
further developed this doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, largely basing its decision on the findings in Underhill.69
In Sabbatino, the Court determined whether a governmental taking
executed by the Cuban government amounted to a form of
expropriation that breached Cuba’s duties under customary
international law.70 The Court held that it was not the responsibility of
U.S. courts to judge the validity of acts committed by foreign,
sovereign governments.71 For this reason, the Court remanded the case
without an affirmative ruling for either party involved.72
Sabbatino articulated for the first time the four elements that
support an act of state doctrine argument: (1) a U.S. court must be
adjudicating the case; (2) the act in question must be public or
governmental; (3) the sovereign must be recognized by the United
States; and (4) the action must have been taken by the foreign
65. See id. at 252–54 (outlining the facts of the case and the foreign policy
concerns underlying judicial decisions of this nature).
66. See id. at 252 (holding that “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government or another, done within its own territory,” implying
that the responsibility for addressing grievances committed by a foreign sovereign
lies with the political branches of the government).
67. See id. at 254 (“We think the circuit court of appeals was justified in
concluding ‘that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of
Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of
another government.’“).
68. See id. at 250, 254 (affirming the circuit court’s decision).
69. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416–17 (1964)
(noting that “[t]he classic American statement of the act of state doctrine . . . is found
in Underhill” and that no subsequent cases “in which the act of state doctrine was
directly or peripherally involved manifest any retreat from Underhill”).
70. See id. at 414–15 (outlining the jurisdictional issue presented to the court).
71. See id. at 439 (“[T]he act of state doctrine proscribes a challenge to the
validity of the Cuban expropriation decree in this case.”).
72. See id. (reversing the lower court’s holding and remanding the case).

2020]

SLAYING THE LEVIATHAN

117

sovereign within the territory of the sovereign.73
Much like the FSIA, the act of state doctrine applies to the
“sovereign corporation.”74 Some legal practitioners believe that there
is a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine, while
others believe that commercial activity taken either directly or
indirectly by a foreign government fails to meet the threshold elements
of Sabbatino in the first instance.75 Regardless of the approach, when
a government acts as a corporation, the act of state doctrine will not
step in and prevent a U.S. court from reviewing the action in
question.76
Examining courts are often asked to evaluate actions taken by
corporations with governmental characteristics, flipping the question
of commerciality.77 When this occurs, the act of state doctrine requires
judges to ask not whether a state is acting as a corporation, but whether
a corporation is acting as a state.78 The Ninth Circuit recently grappled
with this in Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi.79
3.

Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi and the Application of Foreign
State Immunity
In Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi, two corporate plaintiffs asked

73. See id. at 401 (describing the act of state doctrine).
74. See Bazyler, supra note 63, at 370 (discussing how sovereigns are not
immune when engaged, directly or indirectly, in commercial activity under the act
of state doctrine).
75. See id. (describing commercial activity as an exception to the act of state
doctrine); see also Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi, 899 F.3d 1064, 1074–75 (9th
Cir. 2018) (detailing the circuit split regarding the existence of a commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine).
76. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706
(1976) (explaining in one part of the plurality opinion that commercial acts should
be excepted from the act of state doctrine when a government’s agents acted in a
purely commercial role).
77. See, e.g., Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1067 (describing the close ties
between one of the corporate defendants and the Mexican government, which owned
51% of the same).
78. See id. at 1069 (finding that the corporate defendants’ conduct constituted an
act of the Mexican government).
79. See id. (noting that modern understandings of the act of state doctrine require
courts to consider the policies underlying the doctrine in order to determine if and
when to apply it).
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the Ninth Circuit to review the conduct of three corporations—one
Mexican, one Japanese, and one from the United States.80 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated U.S. antitrust and tort
law by engaging in a conspiracy to reroute the distribution of Mexican
solar salt away from the plaintiffs.81 Before evaluating the merits of
the case, the Ninth Circuit considered two threshold issues: the
application of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA and the
availability of jurisdiction under the act of state doctrine.82
First, the Ninth Circuit determined that the commercial activity
exception to the FSIA was applicable in this case because the
commercial conduct of the defendants influenced commercial activity
in the United States.83 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
defendants were not subject to state immunity protections as a matter
of statutory law.84
However, when the Ninth Circuit applied the common law act of
state doctrine, it reached a different result regarding immunity from
suit.85 The Court found that the defendant corporations’ actions
constituted acts of state under the doctrine, barring the Court from
proceeding to an analysis of the merits of the case.86 This conclusion
led the Court to refuse jurisdiction and dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims
in their entirety.87
The tension inherent in these two decisions serves as an example of
how inconsistent immunity doctrines undermine the rule of law by
80. See id. at 1067 (providing an outline of the defendants involved in the case—
Mitsubishi Corporation, a Japanese corporation; Mitsubishi International
Corporation, a New York corporation; and Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V.
(ESSA), a Mexican corporation in which the Mexican government held a 51%
stake).
81. See id. at 1067–68 (outlining the claims alleged by the plaintiffs).
82. See id. at 1068–69 (discussing the application of the FSIA and the act of state
doctrine to plaintiffs’ case).
83. See id. at 1075 n.2 (“[A]gree[ing] with the district court that the FSIA’s
commercial activity exception is applicable.”).
84. See id. (confirming that the district court correctly applied FSIA given the
facts of the case).
85. See id. at 1070–71 (concluding that ESSA’s conduct was an act of state and
therefore not reviewable).
86. See id. (explaining the reasoning behind equating the defendants’ conduct
with the conduct of the Mexican government).
87. Id. at 1075.
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providing an opportunity to bring suit against a state while
simultaneously restricting jurisdictional availability so as to preclude
any such suits from being reviewed on their merits.88

III. ANALYSIS
The international rule of law requires that a party whose rights have
been violated have access to an institutionalized forum for accessing
a remedy.89 For purposes of this paper, this general assertion will be
referenced as the “rule of law formula” – right + violation = access to
remedy.90 When the left side of the formula is satisfied, the national,
regional, or international legal instrument responsible for providing
the right in the first instance is obligated to provide access to a remedy
and round out the formula.91 This is an affirmative duty – i.e., if a state
fails to do this, it has undermined and arguably violated the
international rule of law.92
This section analyzes how different jurisdictional allowances of
state immunity impact the rule of law formula, specifically looking at
the different procedural obligations that states undertake when they
choose to provide restrictive immunity to foreign sovereigns. 93 This
section will also highlight the conflict in the United States between the
application of the FSIA and the common law act of state doctrine, and
how this conduct undermines the international rule of law.94

A. WHEN THE RIGHT TO BRING SUIT AGAINST A STATE IS
GRANTED, A PROCESS MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO ALLOW THAT

88. See infra Part III.B.2.
89. See supra Part II.A. (detailing how access to justice principles are found in
national, regional, and international documents).
90. See generally Peruginelli, supra note 1, at 107 (describing the elements that
are critical to the rule of law).
91. See id. (detailing the importance of judicial process to having a strong rule
of law).
92. See Paulsson, supra note 3, at 2–3 (noting the correlation between the failure
to provide access to justice and the lack of public trust in the court systems).
93. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the affirmative duty undertaken by restrictive
theory jurisdictions to provide process in situations where parties are entitled to it).
94. See infra Part II.B. (detailing the inconsistency between the commerciality
analyses underlying the FSIA and the act of state doctrine).

120

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:1

RIGHT TO BE EXERCISED
1. Absolute Immunity for the Absolute Sovereign
Because governmental immunity restrains plaintiffs from bringing
claims, it denies access to justice. States that apply a Leviathan theory
of state immunity operate under a default wherein an absolute
sovereign can never be subject to suit within the national judiciary. 95
These sovereigns enjoy absolute immunity for any and all claims
brought before national courts.96
Applying the rule of law formula to an absolute immunity
jurisdiction proves simple. In these states, citizens maintain similar
procedural and substantive rights to those provided in restrictive
theory jurisdictions.97 However, because absolute sovereigns have
unquestioned authority, it is impossible for a state ever to commit a
true violation of a party’s rights.98 These states may cause
inconvenience or harm, but, in a technical sense, a state can never be
legally responsible for actions taken in a jurisdiction where it has
absolute immunity.99 Because there cannot be a violation, there will
never be a requirement of judicial process under the rule of law
formula: right + violation = access to a remedy.
A denial of access to justice in certain situations does not prevent
access to justice in all situations.100 In many categories of cases,
national courts may reject and redirect certain claims brought to an
alternative forum that would be more suited to the underlying
dispute.101 The rule of law does not require that national judiciaries
95. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 530 (describing the Leviathan state’s
unquestioned authority and immunity from adhering to its own laws).
96. See id. at 531–32 (noting that absolute immunity states need not respect the
rights of people or parties and, therefore, cannot violate them).
97. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (highlighting a certain similarity in legal
frameworks between restrictive and absolute theory jurisdictions).
98. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 531 (noting that an absolute sovereign has the
power to do as it pleases in all instances).
99. See generally id. at 531–32 (highlighting the fact that a Leviathan state owes
nothing to its people beyond physical protection).
100. See Franck, supra note 31, at 52–54 (describing investment treaty arbitration
as a dispute forum outside of a national court where actions of a state can be
challenged).
101. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589, 597 (1991)
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always allow for judicial process.102 Rather, it requires that when a
nation manifests its intent to provide judicial process, it follows
through on expressed or implicit access to justice promises by
allowing for judicial review in the appropriate circumstances.103
2. A State in Corporate Clothing – Applying Restrictive Immunity to
Sovereign Corporations
States that apply the restrictive theory of state immunity also
grapple with questions related to access to justice and the rule of
law.104 Indeed, these jurisdictions have greater obligations under the
international rule of law than absolute immunity jurisdictions because
of the theory of immunity they have chosen.105
Unlike absolute theory, the restrictive theory tackles commerciality
by promoting a split default.106 This means that when a foreign state
acts like a sovereign, it will be immune from suit.107 But, when a state
acts like a corporation, it will be subject to suit under the commercial
exception of the restrictive theory jurisdiction’s applicable immunity
doctrine.108
For purposes of the rule of law formula, the rights afforded to
people remain the same, but the capacity for a state to commit a
violation has changed. In other words, the formula is adapted to this:
(refusing jurisdiction over a case that involved a valid forum-selection clause that
indicated arbitration as the implicated form of dispute resolution); M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2, 20 (1972) (vacating and remanding the case
based on the existence of a forum-selection clause).
102. See Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 410–12 (describing categorical
exceptions to the state immunity rule which restricted sovereign immunity that states
enjoyed).
103. See Paulsson, supra note 3, at 2–3 (reframing the rule of law as a rare
exception in which a state does provide proper access to judicial remedies).
104. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (describing the restrictive theories approach
to suits against states).
105. See id. at 104 (highlighting examples of different jurisdictions deciding in
favor of restrictive theory by not granting immunity to commercial acts).
106. See Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 410–12 (discussing the split default as it
relates to states acting in a commercial capacity).
107. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (confirming that states still maintain a
degree of immunity, even in restrictive theory jurisdictions).
108. See, e.g., FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1976) (establishing the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA).
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right + violation (limited to commercial conduct) = access to a remedy
(limited to commercial conduct). Because state immunity is still
granted in these states, there will be limits on when states commit
violations, and, consequently, on when process will be due.109
Of course, the determination of commerciality is more easily
described than done. By demonstrating how commerciality under the
FSIA and the act of state doctrine produce different results when
reviewing the same facts, this paper will show how inconsistent
restrictions on state immunity doctrines undermine the international
rule of law.110

B. CLASH OF THE COMMERCIAL EXCEPTIONS
When the United States renounced the absolute theory of state
immunity and enacted the FSIA, it signaled to plaintiffs worldwide
that it was willing and able to rule on cases involving other countries’
governments, so long as the activity in question satisfied the
preconditions outlined in the commercial exception.111 Now, in
contrast to that, the United States seeks to wind back the clock and
block the very plaintiffs it welcomed to its courts from accessing them
under a different, common law doctrine.112 This tension in
jurisdictional availability cannot stand.
1. The Commerciality Exceptions Under the FSIA and the U.S. Act
of State Doctrine are Inconsistent
International standards surrounding access to justice mandate that
legal processes be available for redressing harm committed in the
violation of a party’s protected rights.113 Many states value absolute
immunity over access to justice.114 Under the absolute theory of state
109. See generally, FSIA § 1604 (maintaining that states will remain immune
from suit so long as their conduct does not fall in one of the outlined exceptions).
110. Infra Part III.B.2.
111. FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (excluding foreign governments that engage in primarily
commercial activity in the United States from state immunity).
112. See Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi, 899 F.3d 1064, 1072–74 (9th Cir.
2018) (explaining the act of state doctrine).
113. See Peruginelli, supra note 1, at 107–08 (describing the role of institutional
process in the promotion of access to justice).
114. See generally Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1068–69 (articulating the
rationales for providing state immunity to other countries).
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immunity, a state cannot violate a party’s rights and, therefore, judicial
process will never be required because a remedy will never be
deserved.115 This limitation on process represents a policy question,
but not necessarily a rule of law problem – as judicial review in these
instances was never allowed or expected in the first instance.116
The access to justice problem arises when a state is unclear in its
position, thereby opening the door to allow a legal process and then
slamming that same door closed in the face of a deserving plaintiff.117
By providing parties with the limited right to bring suit against states
acting as corporations, restrictive theory countries have undertaken the
affirmative duty of providing access to judicial processes in those
situations.118
When the United States opted for the restrictive theory of state
immunity, it decided that individuals and companies should have the
right to access judicial review against states acting as corporate
sovereigns.119 Barring access to that process through the application of
another contradictory common law immunity doctrine undermines
this access and the rule of law as a whole.120
The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and common
law act of state doctrine both address commerciality as a restriction on
state immunity from suit.121 In many cases, the FSIA and the act of
state doctrine cover different types of state conduct – with the FSIA
focusing on internal connections to the United States and the act of
state doctrine focusing on conduct occurring in a foreign sovereign’s
115. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 531–32 (outlining the contours of absolute state
immunity).
116. See id. (noting that an absolute sovereign is immune from following the law).
117. See Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1068, 1075 n. 2 (describing the
conflicting decisions regarding commerciality and refusing to hear the case further).
118. See Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (indicating that, under the restrictive theory,
people had some, albeit limited, right to bring suit against other states).
119. See generally Nagan & Root, supra note 8, at 411 (outlining various states’
transitions away from absolute immunity and towards restrictive immunity,
especially where commercial activity is concerned).
120. See infra Part III.B.2 (connecting the failure in maintaining consistent
doctrines with a denial of process and an inevitable negative impact on the rule of
law).
121. See generally FSIA 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) (providing an exception
for commercial activity); Bazyler, supra note 63, at 370 (describing different
approaches to commerciality under the act of state doctrine).
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territory.122 This internal versus external split has often led to only one
of these doctrines being applicable per case.123 However, as
transnational commercial activities have grown increasingly complex,
the opportunity for both doctrines to apply and for them to conflict
with one another has arisen.
On the one hand, the FSIA’s commercial exception focuses on
commercial conduct that occurs within or that is connected to the
United States.124 It represents a judgment call by the legislative branch
that when a foreign state engages in commercial dealings that affect
U.S. commerce, that state should be subject to suit in U.S. national
courts.125 Of course, this restriction on state immunity is limited (i.e.,
the state can only be brought to suit for activity that expressly falls into
this exception).126
Meanwhile, the act of state doctrine focuses on the activity of a
sovereign conducted within that sovereign’s own territory.127 This
doctrine also considers commerciality, although scholars and courts
disagree about how it does so.128 Some believe that there is a
122. See Jonathan M. Wight, An Evaluation of the Commercial Activities
Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1265, 1279–80, 1282–
83 (1994) (describing the relationship between sovereign immunity as articulated in
the FSIA and the act of state doctrine).
123. See id. at 1279–80 (explaining sovereign immunity and state doctrine cannot
both apply when defendant’s own territory and the forum state are different).
124. FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (exempting any commercial activity “carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States”).
125. See id. (providing that a “foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case[ . . . ]in which
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States”).
126. See generally id. § 1605(a) (stating that this subsection is intended to serve
as exceptions to the larger provision of immunity).
127. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (noting
that the fourth element of the doctrine is that the foreign sovereign must have taken
the action within the territory of the sovereign).
128. See Sea Breeze Salt, Inc. v. Mitsubishi, 899 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2018)
(detailing the circuit split that has erupted out of the varied application of the act of
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commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine that allows
acts of states to come before U.S. courts if they are sufficiently
commercial.129 Others focus on the threshold elements of the doctrine
and claim that commercial activity fails to meet these elements as it is
not “public or governmental.”130 Whichever approach is taken, the
result is the same – when a government acts as a corporation, the act
of state doctrine will not be applied to prevent a U.S. court from
reviewing the action in question.131 This approach to commerciality
largely aligns with the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.132
Unfortunately, the fact that they are largely in alignment, but not
completely so, indicates that there is a margin within which these two
doctrines produce different results when applied to the same
circumstances.133 The rights, obligations, and policies involved in
circumstances where the FSIA and act of state doctrine conflict are
obtuse in the abstract. Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi demonstrates
how the right to access justice extended by the FSIA can be squashed
through the application of the act of state doctrine.134 The refusal to
allow access in this case undermines the international rule of law,
which mandates access to justice for the violation of a protected
right.135

state doctrine’s purported commercial activities exception and highlighting the lack
of clarity surrounding the exception).
129. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706
(1976) (believed to be the plurality opinion that established the commercial
exception); see also Bazyler, supra note 63, at 370 (discussing the commercial
exception to the act of state doctrine).
130. See Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1074–75 (distinguishing between
conduct that is commercial and conduct that is public or governmental).
131. See Wight, supra note 122, at 1282–83 (describing how commercial
activities of states may be subject to review by U.S. courts).
132. See generally FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (outlining the commercial activity
exception to the FSIA).
133. See 899 F.3d at 1075 n.2 (serving as an example of an instance where the
FSIA and the act of state doctrine returned different results when applied to the same
factual scenario).
134. See id. at 1075 (holding that the act of state doctrine applied to the case and
the court lacked jurisdiction to review).
135. See Peruginelli, supra note 1, at 107–08 (noting that access to law is
fundamental for the purpose of not only policy of justice, but also public policy and
social cohesion).
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2. The Conflict Between the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine
Undermines the International Rule of Law by Failing to Align the
Rights Provided with the Process Accessible
Even though steps have been taken to make access to justice and
state immunity coexist in the international commercial sphere,136 there
is still room for growth, especially in the United States. The United
States’ application of the act of state doctrine creates a category of
non-litigable cases, wherein the plaintiffs have no hope of accessing
justice under a national court system or an alternative form of dispute
resolution. Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi is an example of one of
these cases.137 It falls within a category of disputes that is unfit for an
institutionalized dispute resolution forum because of the parties, the
chronology, and the claim itself.
As discussed previously, Sea Breeze Salt Inc. was a case that came
up through the Ninth Circuit.138 It involved five parties of different
nationalities—U.S., Mexican, and Japanese—and a series of antitrust
and state law tort claims.139 Before the Ninth Circuit got to the merits
of the case, it first had to make two threshold determinations about the
application of the FSIA and of the act of state doctrine.140 These
determinations were necessary because one of the defendants—
ESSA—had close ties to the Mexican government.141 In a bizarre turn
of events, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the FSIA’s commercial
activity exception applied in this case.142 It then concluded, however,
136. See generally Koumi, supra note 4, at 101 (highlighting the growing
popularity of restrictive state immunity doctrines and the manner that they interface
within the transnational commercial sphere).
137. See 899 F.3d at 1075 (providing a case study for a claim that was rendered
unfit for institutionalized dispute resolution by the Ninth Circuit).
138. See id. at 1067 (introducing the context of the case).
139. See Complaint, supra note 10, at 1 (describing how plaintiffs, Sea Breeze
Salt, Inc. (U.S. company) and Innofoods (Mexican company) initiated suit against
defendants, ESSA (Mexican company), Mitsubishi International (U.S. Company),
and Mitsubishi Corporation (Japanese company), for violation of U.S. antitrust laws
and engagement in common law torts under Californian law).
140. See generally 899 F.3d at 1074 n.2 (discussing the FSIA and the act of state
doctrines’ exceptions regarding government conduct that is commercial in nature).
141. See id. at 1069 (explaining how the Mexican government was sufficiently
involved in ESSA’s activities to merit a threshold review of sovereign immunity
application under the FSIA and act of state doctrines).
142. See id. at 1069 n.2 (agreeing with the district court that “the FSIA’s
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that the actions involved were not reviewable by the court because
they met the elements of the act of state doctrine.143 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case without looking at the merits of the
plaintiffs’ claims.144
These two outcomes on the same set of facts indicate that the
doctrines have two ways of analyzing commerciality. 145 Under the
FSIA, a state acting as a commercial entity is subject to suit in the
United States.146 However, under the act of state doctrine, a
commercial entity standing in the place of a sovereign state is not
subject to suit in the United States.147 Now—this is where it gets
complicated. There are two main questions to ask when evaluating
commerciality under these doctrines.148 Who is the actor? And what is
the nature of the conduct?
In Sea Breeze Salt Inc. v. Mitsubishi, the Ninth Circuit concluded
first that the defendants were not due immunity under the FSIA
because while the FSIA did apply to the governmental parties
involved, the conduct in question satisfied the commercial exception
to immunity contemplated in the statute.149 Then, in the same opinion,
commercial activity exception is applicable because the suit is based upon ‘an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States’“).
143. See id. at 1069 (describing how ESSA was a government agent for purposes
of the act of state doctrine because the Mexican government owned 51% of the
corporation, the government controlled ESSA’s board, and because ESSA’s conduct
related to the export of solar salt, a natural resource said to be distributable solely by
the Mexican government under the Mexican Constitution).
144. See id. at 1075 (refusing to proceed any further with the case, in light of the
act of state doctrine’s application).
145. See generally id. at 1075 n.2 (indicating the different conclusions regarding
commerciality under the two doctrines).
146. FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (describing the commercial nature of the exception to the
FSIA).
147. See, e.g., Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1069 (concluding that ESSA (a
Mexican corporation) was standing in the shoes of the Mexican government and
therefore capable of conducting acts of state sufficient to serve as a jurisdictional
barrier to suit).
148. See FSIA §1605(a)(2) (indicating that for a state to be immune under the
FSIA, the actor and the conduct must both be sovereign in nature); see also Wight,
supra note 122, at 1282–83 (describing similar requirements under the act of state
doctrine).
149. See 899 F.3d at 1075 n. 2 (finding that ESSA was a government actor and,
therefore, the FSIA applied, but concluding that the conduct was commercial and
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the Ninth Circuit concluded that under the act of state doctrine, ESSA
was acting as the Mexican government, and the conduct was not
commercial.150 These two findings are inconsistent, with one returning
a conclusion of commercial activity and the other returning a result of
non-commercial or governmental activity.151
It now makes sense to return to the rule of law formula (right +
violation = access to a remedy) one last time. In this instance, under
U.S. antitrust and California tort law, the plaintiffs did have
substantive rights at issue.152 So, the first element of the formula has
been met: right (present) + violation = access to a remedy.
Under the FSIA, ESSA, or the Mexican Government, was not
immune from suit and was therefore capable of violating those
substantive rights.153 Thus, the second prong of the formula was
satisfied: right (present) + violation (present) = access to a remedy.
However, the act of state doctrine stepped in as a jurisdictional
barrier and prevented the case from being heard on the merits.154 In
other words, it denied the plaintiffs the right to access justice to which
it was entitled under the international rule of law. This denial limited
the plaintiffs’ ability to access a remedy on the right side of the
formula, resulting in the following: right (present) + violation
(present) = access to a remedy.
Because the left and right sides of this formula are out of balance, it
becomes clear that the rule of law has been undermined—in this case,
by the inconsistent application of restrictive state immunity
doctrines.155
thus immunity should not be granted).
150. See id. at 1069 (concluding that ESSA was a government actor and that the
conduct in question was governmental).
151. See id. at 1075 n.2 (indicating that the conduct engaged in by ESSA was both
commercial under the FSIA and not commercial under the act of state doctrine).
152. See generally Complaint, supra note 10, at 1 (outlining the plaintiffs’ claims
in reference to their substantive rights under U.S. antitrust laws and California tort
law).
153. See Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1075 n.2 (allowing the court to retain
jurisdiction over the instant case).
154. See id. at 1075 (restricting the court from proceeding to a further review of
plaintiffs’ case following the application of the act of state doctrine).
155. Cf. id. (demonstrating how inconsistency in state immunity protections can
eliminate a party’s right to bring suit).
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When a party is provided the right to bring suit and suffers a
violation fit for review, then the international rule of law requires that
the party have access to an institutionalized forum for dispute
resolution.156 Currently, the conflict between the FSIA and the act of
state doctrine undermines the international rule of law by failing to
align the rights provided with the process available.157

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ESTABLISH A STATUTORY
DEFAULT FOR REVIEWING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY FOR PURPOSES
OF STATE IMMUNITY
The conflict between the FSIA and the act of state doctrine indicates
inconsistent positioning towards restrictive state immunity in the
United States.158 Rather than allow this inconsistency to stand, the
United States should make the FSIA the statutory default in cases
involving commercially active foreign states.159 Such a default would
provide critical guidance regarding a state’s immunity from suit with
respect to commercial dealings.
Instituting the FSIA as the statutory default would serve three
important policy considerations. First, a default would quell concerns
surrounding the separation of powers. The act of state doctrine largely
developed out of the fear that U.S. judiciaries would inappropriately
make decisions that would have foreign policy implications.160 The
U.S. Supreme Court felt it necessary to prevent this by instituting a

156. See Peruginelli, supra note 1, at 107 (articulating a party’s right to process
under the international rule of law).
157. See generally Sea Breeze Salt, Inc., 899 F.3d at 1075 (demonstrating the
harm caused by the inconsistent treatment of commercial activities under the FSIA
and the act of state doctrine).
158. See id. at 1075 n.2 (showing how the FSIA and the act of state doctrine can
yield inconsistent results regarding the application of state immunity).
159. Cf. State Immunity Act 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798 (Can.) (providing
an example of Canada’s clear statutory default in the restrictive state immunity
context).
160. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (providing the initial
policy rationales underlying the development of the common law act of state
doctrine).
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common law doctrine punting these issues out of national courts. 161
After the institution of the FSIA, however, this concern was
alleviated.162 The legislative branch actively spoke through the text of
the FSIA of its intention that U.S. courts should judge the validity of
commercial actions taken by foreign states.163 To allow the act of state
doctrine to supersede that mandate would be to undermine the
legislative branch’s voice on these matters, as expressed in the FSIA.
Second, having the FSIA as a default in cases of inconsistency
would provide greater clarity to issues of state immunity. The act of
state doctrine has been and still is a hotly debated doctrine with a
complicated application history.164 Requiring plaintiffs and defendants
to sift through this history when there is an alternative standard
available is a waste of both party and judicial resources.
Finally, this default would bring a higher level of predictability into
the realm of state immunity—a development that would benefit
individuals, companies, and states engaging in transnational activities.
So long as the inconsistency between the FSIA and the act of state
doctrine continues, parties on both sides of pending and future
litigation will be forced to engage in a preventable guessing game.
In a world of increased commercial dealings, consistency is key.
Here, the United States should make the FSIA the statutory default for
purposes of determining whether state immunity will be granted in
cases of commercial activity. This step toward a more consistent
restrictive immunity regime is critical to establishing a stable
framework for future cases that involve both governmental and
commercial elements.

B. CORPORATIONS OPERATING TRANSNATIONALLY SHOULD DO

161. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(developing further the act of state doctrine in line with ongoing concerns regarding
the judiciary’s role in international diplomacy).
162. See generally FSIA §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (serving as the first
statutory codification of sovereign immunity for foreign states in the United States).
163. See generally id. (representing the will of the legislature as expressed
through statutory provisions).
164. See generally Bazyler, supra note 63, at 327–28 (warning that confusion
about the act of state doctrine has caused courts to misapply the doctrine).

2020]

SLAYING THE LEVIATHAN

131

THEIR BEST TO PREPARE FOR UNSTABLE IMMUNITY REGIMES
So long as unstable restrictive immunity regimes like the United
States exist, commercial entities should take steps to manage the risks
associated with their business dealings, especially where corporate
engagement with foreign state actors is concerned.
While an unpredictable legal framework provides unique
challenges to companies like Sea Breeze Salt Inc., harm can be
mitigated with thoughtful use of political risk or litigation insurance,165
contracts with dispute resolution clauses,166 considerate corporate
structuring, and smart business dealings. Of course, as such things are
also subject to uncertainty and inconsistency, it is doubtful that these
measures could ever serve as a full remedy to the challenges brought
about by inconsistent immunity doctrines.
Because the international dispute resolution climate is ever shifting,
the main takeaway for companies should be this—think early and
often about how disputes will be resolved in the event they arise.
Uncertainty in this area is a certainty, so monitoring developments and
being flexible in the face of adversity are key to managing risk and
protecting international commercial activities.

V. CONCLUSION
Under the international rule of law, a state must provide the access
to justice that it affirmatively indicates its people are entitled to expect.
In absolute theory jurisdictions, there is no expectation that suit could
be brought against a foreign state, and so there is no rule of law
problem when access is never granted. Alternatively, however, when
a restrictive theory state grants its people the right to bring suit against
foreign states in certain instances, it takes upon itself the obligation to
provide process when appropriate.
In the United States, the FSIA extends the right to bring suit against
a foreign state to cases where the foreign state acts as a commercial
165. See Celine Tan, Risky Business: Political Risk Insurance and the Law and
Governance of Natural Resources, 11 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 2, 174–94 (2015)
(describing broadly the role political risk insurance can play in dealings surrounding
natural resource distribution).
166. Cf. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (affirming the
validity of a dispute resolution clause calling for arbitration).
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entity. Thus, the U.S. has undertaken the duty to provide access to
justice in those cases. In Sea Breeze Salt Inc., the U.S. failed to follow
through on this duty by using the act of state doctrine to renege on
protection previously extended under the FSIA. This action
undermines the rule of law by blocking access to justice in a situation
where a plaintiff was statutorily entitled to it.
To solve this problem, the United States should implement
legislation that eliminates inconsistencies in its immunity doctrine.
Alternatively, corporations and individuals should think critically and
holistically when entering into commercial relationships,
contemplating up front the types of jurisdictional pitfalls they could
encounter by working with entities that are partially governmental in
nature.

